Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud was published in 24 volumes in the UK from 1950 onwards by the Institute of Psycho-Analysis and Hogarth Press.
This new 2016 release of PEP-Web contains the complete text and illustrations of 68 premier journals in psychoanalysis, 100 classic psychoanalytic books, and the full text and Editorial notes of the 24 volumes of the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud as well as the 19 volume German Freud Standard Edition Gesammelte Werke. It spans over 145 publication years and contains the full text of articles whose source ranges from 1871 through 2016. There are over 105,000 articles and over 14,900 figures and illustrations that originally resided on 2112 volumes with over 950,000 printed pages. In hard copy, the PEP Archive represents a stack of paper more than 311 feet high and weighing over 4 tons!
Alison, L., West A., & Goodwill, A. (2004). The academic and the practitioner: Pragmatists' views of offender profiling. (1/2), 71-101. doi: 10.1037/1076-8971.10.1/2.71 Pragmatic psychology, as outlined by D. Fishman (1999), serves as the inspiration for this article's recommendation to integrate the currently opposing factions within offender profiling. These factions have variously been referred to as "inductive/ deductive," "statistical/clinical," or "academic/practitioner" approaches. This article outlines how the separation into different factions is both misrepresentative and needlessly divisive and thus undermines the potential contribution of behavioral science to the investigative endeavor. Through a case study, the article illustrates how a pragmatist's approach would encourage a more productive and synergistic dialogue between the camps. This, in turn, may lead to the creation of a useful and productive archive that would facilitate the professionalization of what has too often seemed an ill-formed forensic discipline. . . . Fishman's argument is, in essence, that both the systematic collection of detailed case studies and the cumulative analysis of this material to extract broad trends are mutually beneficial to both the academic and practitioner. . . . there have been few efforts to validate profile classifications.
American Psychiatric Association (1980). (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: Author. Andrade: The DSM-III (1980) and its revision DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) dramatically shifted from its preceding text with the replacement of sociopathy to the new diagnostic category: Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD). This clinical construct was no longer defined by personality traits, as in the clinical tradition of psychopathy, but rather by a set of behavioral criteria. . . . Easy to assess behavioral traits result in an over inclusive, but reliably measured construct. The core personality attributes of psychopathy are no longer included in the criteria.
Adshead, G. (2003), Measuring moral identities: psychopaths and responsibility. (2), 185-7. doi:10.1353/ppp.2003.0086 Doctor Ciocchetti examines the responsibility of psychopaths as a function of psychological capacities operating within relationships. He then argues against the punishment of psychopaths. I have some sympathy with both views, but perhaps argued in different ways, and from different standpoints, based on my clinical experience. Doctor Ciocchetti's offers an unusual account of responsibility as a concept that involves at least two people, and perhaps many more than two; and this I would entirely support. In this sense, responsibility is a transitive and dynamic process that involves not only the personal sense of ownership of an action or thought, but also the attribution of responsibility by others. Moral, when applied to intentions, seems to me to suggest that they are intentions that involve another person and that they are held by an active agent who can make choices about those intentions. Responsibility implies not only causal responsibility, but also that the actor owns his own intentions about his behaviors toward others. Responsibility, either as experienced by the actor or attributed by others, is a type of moral judgment; an exercise in moral reasoning.
Levenson, M. R., Kiehl, K. A., & Fitzpatrick, C. M. (1995). Assessing psychopathic attributes in a noninstitutionalized population. (1), 151-158. doi:10.1037/0022-35220.127.116.11 Examined antisocial dispositions in 487 university students. Primary and secondary psychopathy scales were developed to assess a protopsychopathic interpersonal philosophy. An antisocial action scale also was developed for purposes of validation. The primary, secondary, and antisocial action scales were correlated with each other and with boredom susceptibility and disinhibition but not with experience seeking and thrill and adventure seeking. Secondary psychopathy was associated with trait anxiety. Multiple regression analysis revealed that the strongest predictors of antisocial action were disinhibition, primary psychopathy, secondary psychopathy, and sex, whereas thrill and adventure seeking was a negative predictor. This argues against a singular behavioral inhibition system mediating both antisocial and risk-taking behavior. These findings are also consistent with the view that psychopathy is a continuous dimension. . . . That 23% of the men in the study endorsed 8 or more of the 16 primary psychopathy items suggests the possibility of a significant risk factor for behavior that may entail considerable social cost. We hope that these apparent attitudes would be rejected by most on closer inspection or would "mature out" as these young adults have more direct experience with consequences of antisocial behavior.
Leibing, E., Jamrozinski, K., Vormfelde, S. V., Stahl, J., & Doering, S. (2008). Dimensions of personality—relationship between DSM-IV personality disorder symptoms, the five-factor model, and the biosocial model of personality. (1), 101-108. doi:10.1521/pedi.2008.22.1.101 Dimensional approaches regard personality disorders as extreme or maladaptive variants of traits that are commonly used to describe normal personality. Previous clinical and nonclinical studies identified four factors interpreted as Antisocial, Asocial, Asthenic, and Anankastic. To investigate the validity of this four-factor structure in healthy volunteers, 97 male and 98 female students completed versions of the NEO-PI-R and TPQ. Symptoms of personality disorders were assessed using the ADP-IV questionnaire. A factor analysis of the personality and symptom scales revealed a four-factor solution accounting for 71.55% of the total variance. These factors resembling the "four A's" were labelled Asthenic, Sociable vs. Asocial, Antisocial, and Disorderly vs. Anankastic. The results of this study support the presence of four factors in the description of adaptive as well as maladaptive personality traits.
Lee, Z., & Salekin, R. T. (2010). Psychopathy in a noninstitutional sample: Differences in primary and secondary subtypes. (3), 153-169. doi:10.1037/a0019269. Early theoretical conceptualizations suggest psychopathy is a heterogeneous construct whereby psychopathic individuals are found in diverse populations. The current study examined male and female psychopathy subtypes in a large sample of undergraduate students (n = 1229). Model-based cluster analysis of the Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Short Form (PPI-SF) revealed two clusters in both male and female students. In males, the primary subtype evidenced greater psychopathic personality traits (i.e., Social Potency, Fearlessness, and Impulsive Nonconformity) and lower anxiety (i.e., higher Stress Immunity), whereas the secondary subtype displayed fewer psychopathic personality traits (i.e., Machiavellian Egocentricity and Blame Externalization) and higher anxiety (i.e., lower Stress Immunity). In females, the primary subtype exhibited higher scores across all PPI-SF subscales and lower anxiety whereas the secondary subtype reported lower PPI-SF subscale scores and higher anxiety. Across a diverse array of personality, affective, and behavioral external correlates, differences between the subtypes and with nonpsychopaths emerged. Implications for psychopathy in noninstitutional populations with respect to theory, research, and gender are discussed.
LaBrode, R. T. (2007). Etiology of the psychopathic serial killer: An analysis of antisocial personality disorder, psychopathy, and serial killer personality and crime scene characteristics. (2), 151-160. doi:10.1093/brief-treatment/mhm004 The purpose of this article is to make the distinction between antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy, discuss possible etiologies of psychopathy, and analyze the crimes, personality characteristics, and historical aspects of psychopathic serial killers. The research indicates that both environmental and biological factors affect the development of psychopathy. Several different serial killers were compared to assess the similarities and differences between their histories, crimes, and personalities. Though there were marked differences between their crimes, startling historical and personality similarities were clearly identified. Based on these findings, the validity and reliability of offender profiling is also discussed.
Levy, N. (2007b). The Responsibility of the Psychopath Revisited. (2), 129-138. doi: 10.1353/ppp.0.0003. The question of the psychopath's responsibility for his or her wrongdoing has received considerable attention. Much of this attention has been directed toward whether psychopaths are a counterexample to motivational internalism (MI): Do they possess normal moral beliefs, which fail to motivate them? In this paper, I argue that this is a question that remains conceptually and empirically intractable, and that we ought to settle the psychopath's responsibility in some other way. I argue that recent empirical work on the moral judgments of psychopaths provides us with good reason to think that they are not fully responsible agents, because their actions cannot express the kinds of ill-will toward others that grounds attributions of distinctively moral responsibility. I defend this view against objections, especially those due to an influential account of moral responsibility that holds that moral knowledge is not necessary for responsibility.