The point of stating these observations is that it seems to me that1) some people are in a better position than others to understand a (prospective)child's best interests and best needs -- and thus in a better positionto understand the (prospective) child's quality of life (and/or the child'sself-perception of that quality) and 2) some people have a great psychologicalconcern of their own involved in what happens to (their) children -- andthus perhaps have more at stake, and perhaps, then, should have more tosay about how (their) (prospective) children should be treated. I suspectmuch more research needs to be done and much more reflection needs to begiven to 1) who is most likely to understand the needs of children, 2)what the needs of children really are, 3) the factors that give rise toemotional bonds with children, and 4) how biologically deep-seated, and/orlearned, and/or arbitrary and accidental, and/or how important and reasonablethese bonds or feelings are. Insofar as a parent is likely to understandthat the quality of life for his/her child will make that child miserable,and insofar as that parent has a reasonable and legitimate (not just arbitraryor accidental) concern of his/her own for the quality of life the childwill experience, the parent's informed choice, I think ought to have moreweight. The question is whether the prospective parent faced with the considerationof abortion is more (probably) knowledgeable about the prospective child'sneeds, and whether that prospective parent's own psychological feelingsare reasonable and/or reasonably changeable or not.
At any rate, it seems to me to be these are the kinds of things thatpeople should consider in determining whether or not to terminate the lifeof a given fetus when one is considering simply what is best for the fetusand the person it would become if allowed to survive, cases where others'overriding rights are not at issue (as in maternal self-defense). One shouldconsider what its future will most likely be like, and what its beliefswill likely be about the value and worth of the kind of life you are bringingit into. Anti-abortionists often say that abortion does not give the embryoa chance to be born; but if you feel the embryo will be born into a lifeof misery and suffer grievously and incommensurately from it, your replywould be that by abortion you are not forcing it to be born, born to alife that will only prolong its misery and suffering. Whether we are givingthe gift of life to our children or are simply forcing them to come intoan unsatisfactory existence are not just two ways of looking at the samething, but are radically different evaluations of the same thing.
(3) Concerning the issue of abortion with regard to normally healthy,non-rape engendered fetuses:
first with regard to removal, second with regard to termination offetal life. Once technology reaches the point where a very young fetuscan be safely transplanted from one woman to another or reaches the pointwhere an embryo can be safely maintained mechanically until it reachesmaturity, it would seem to be morally quite unproblematic, for any womanwho wants to, to be allowed to have an embryo removed from her womb sothat it could be transplanted or put on life-support equipment. There wouldno longer be the question of termination of the fetal life. However, (1)that point is not yet approached by science, and so early abandonment isnow concommitant with fetal death; (2) there may be cases in the futurewhere a biological genetic (as opposed to a biological gestation) parent(when fetal transplants become possible) may not only seek fetal removal,but fetal death too -- not wanting the embryo to be implanted into a volunteer'shost womb or to be nurtured to "birth" or maturity by technology. In thissecond case, should the genetic parents have the right to determine whetherthe fetus should be allowed to survive or not?
First, abortion is always a bad thing because it does end a unique,particular life or a very near, potential life; yet it may not be the wrongthing, since it may be the best alternative of a bunch of bad alternatives,or it may be the result of a right that overrides a greater good. Someright actions in life are those which involve bad things, for example whensomeone has to have their leg amputated in order to save their life, orwhen someone has to have prolonged and painful treatment to prevent rabieswhen the dog who bit them cannot be found. A bad option can be the rightoption to choose in making a decision if it (1) is based on a right thatoverrides other actions or if it (2) is the best option open to the agentwho will perform the action and is an option that does not violate someoverriding right. An example concerning such an overriding right, usuallygiven in ethics classes, is the right of an innocent person not to be punishedfor a crime authorities know he did not commit but could frame him forto the public, just in order to deter future potential criminals, evenif that were to save countless future victims. Innocent people have a rightnot to be punished just to serve as an example of what would happen toa person guilty of a particular kind of crime, regardless of how much betterconditions would be if some innocent person was occasionally punished,or even executed, that way. Hence, with regard to abortion, abortion ofa fetus (which leads to its death) may be right if it is the best of abunch of bad alternatives available, or if there is some overriding reasonor some other right which overrides the fetal right to life, as in thecase where the mother's life is in jeopardy if she carries the child longenough for it to be viable (i.e., the mother's right of self-defense).Likewise abortion would be wrong if it is not the best alternative and/orif the fetus has a right to life overriding alternatives even though thosealternatives may make others better off in the long run. So the questioncomes to whether there are better alternatives than termination of thefetus or not, and whether in different cases there are rights which overridethe best alternatives -- either on behalf of the fetus when terminationgives the better situation for others, or on behalf of others when non-terminationgives the better situation for the fetus and/or those other than the geneticparent(s).
Assuming the reader of this essay agrees with the above definition, I will explore the following thesis, and support my answer with appropriate, adequate documentation, from "Conversations": "Should abortion be legal.
To take another kind of similar case: suppose that it turns out we arenever able, from a practical standpoint, to viably thaw out people whoare cryogenically frozen in the hope that whatever disease they had beforefreezing can someday be cured. We, of course, might say that such peopleare "frozen alive", but are they really still alive? There is no telling,not because we don't know anything about them, but because the conceptof "alive" never was clearly enough defined or used before to let us discoverwhether it applies in such a case or not. There would be nothing to discover,just a stipulation or decision to be made, an arbitrary stipulation ordecision. Whether embryos or fetuses should be called alive or human ornot is not really important; what is important is that normal fetuses,without abortions being performed, generally become human beings -- thisis the most salient fact. Whether they should be called human or alive,or things that can be murdered, at a stage earlier than they were beforeis an arbitrary matter to be pronounced rather than discovered. But themost salient point about fetuses is that in a fairly short time -- at birth-- they will be alive and human. If we stipulated that a four day old fetuswas not yet alive or human, and that a five day old fetus was, it seemsto me that the fact killing it on the fifth day would be called murderand killing it on the fourth day would not be called murder makes virtuallyno difference in the morality of the situation. I doubt it would make anydifference to the fetus. Consciousness or self-consciousness would be insignificanton the fifth day and nothing else of any moral relevance would be significantlydifferent either. I am not saying that when some people die makesno difference; I am only saying that I think when a fetus dies makes nodifference, no significant moral difference. I think that may also be trueof a newborn baby; that a newborn baby dies is significant, but whetherit dies on its second day after birth or its third day seems to be of littleconsequence relative to continuing to live. Whether a fetus is killed ornot is morally significant, not when. At the other end of the spectrumthere is a joke on an old Jewish toast that one should live "to be 120years old". One fellow toasts to his friend that he should live to be "120and three days." The friend asks why the extra three days, and the onegiving the toast says "because I don't want you should drop dead all ofa sudden." The point of the humor is that it is hard to imagine that formost people it would matter much at all whether they live to be 120 or120 and three days. Three days at the beginning of a short life or at theend of a long life, it seems to me, are of very little consequence, absentsomething very special that could only happen in those three days time.
I once ventured upon some adolescent boys getting ready to torture ayoung cat by throwing it into a mass of sticker bushes to see how it woulddo. I interceded on behalf of the cat. The main antagonist, a fairly largeboy, was displeased by my intervention and said that I had no businessinterfering with their fun. His main comment was that it was his cat andhe could do anything he wanted to it. I take it that this is a form ofthe privacy (and private property) argument, that this was a private matterand I had no right to intervene. I did not at the time see fit to arguethe merits of the case on that particular issue and instead gave him othergrounds which I thought might appeal to him. I suggested that if he couldnot see any reason to see the similarity between the cat's feelings andhis own that I might help him see the relationship in this instance betweenthe cat's well-being and his own. This convinced him for the time at leastthat harming the cat might not be in his own best interest. But it occurredto me later that the cat's being his cat gave him not less responsibilityfor its well-being, as he seemed to think, but gave him even more responsibilityfor its well-being. In general, the owners of pets and the parents of youngchildren are held responsible for at least certain minimal standards oftheir charges' welfare. Recently enacted laws in a number of states requiringparents to have their children in car restraints while the car is in motionis another example of balancing parental privacy with child welfare onthe side of the welfare rather than privacy. And it does seem to me, havingseen so many parents who dangerously, carelessly, and recklessly allowtheir children to ride standing up on the front seat (as if to give theirheads better aim at the windshields in case of sudden braking or frontalcollision) that the innocent child should have a champion in the stateif the parents do not fulfill reasonable obligations. In general, a womandoes have some responsibility toward her children and even toward her unbornfetus. How much is open to discussion. And in general parents cannot justifablytreat their children any way they would want to, especially if that meansharming or killing the child, or risking its life or health needlessly.I would expect there to be made similar cases for fetal rights, thoughjust how much, and whether it could preclude abortion or not, and underwhat circumstances, is what is at issue. The point here is that privacy,by itself, is insufficient to morally justify abortion and/or other sortsof fetal harm -- regardless of the Supreme Court's legal decision.
A couple of decades ago when abortion was illegal, thousands of woman died for attempting to terminate the child’s life themselves or with unprofessional help.
Mindful Moments Day Challenge Blog Archive Thesis statement cover letter Persuasive Essay Bullying Thesis For Students In Uk Usa On A Friends Birthday Partypersuasive
And, it seems at least somewhat plausible to me, that a woman carryinga known severely deformed fetus might be able to deserve an abortion ifshe wants it for the same reason. Because in a sense she did not intentionallyor negligently conceive this very unfortunate, prospective suffering, anddifficult to care for kind of a child. If her intention was to conceiveand bear a healthy baby (or she was at least not unwilling to do that,even if not actually intending to), and she took prudent measures to insureany conceived child would be healthy, she is not thereby responsible formaintaining a deformed fetus, one that will have a very sad and/or sufferingkind of life, if born, and bring much sorrow because of that to its family.