Jung (Jung 1912a) first broke with Freud by enlarging the concept of libido from a purely sexual force to heterogeneity of all possible psychic forces. He retained the term libido which, as Jung chose to define it, was similar to Schopenhauer’s will. Jung’s period of more global determinism was short lived however, because in his paper ‘On psychic energy’, first conceived in 1913 but not published until 1928, he made a much more radical break with Freud by proposing that the psychic causality is primarily teleological (Jung 1928a). Jung, through his experiments with the word association test, had already developed the idea that the unconscious was composed of multiple units of subjectivity, which he called complexes (Jung 1912b). He said that these complexes were affect-laden representations of self and object in relationship. They had been split off from consciousness, which he called the ego complex, due to adaptation to the social environment. Jung said that analysis was initiated when the attitude of the unconscious, more specifically that of a split-off complex, was brought into a conscious relationship with the attitude of consciousness, the ego complex. Analysis then proceeded via the integration of these opposing attitudes to form a more adaptive attitude. This new attitude, and an accompanying new epistemology was the telos. Jung called this process individuation and compared it to the incarnation of God’s purpose (Jung 1928b).
Abraham, one of Freud’s closest early collaborators, is considered as the unwitting father of object relations theory (Meltzer 1971). He proposed the idea of conflict between modes of expression around erogenous zones (Abraham 1979). These ideas were taken up by Melanie Klein, his student and analysand, in whose work teleological elements can be seen in her ideas concerning the attainment of more stable whole object relations (Klein 1975). She did, however, retain Freud’s determinism in her own concept of instincts. Simultaneously, Fairbairn was also developing concepts of mental splitting. In contrast to Klein, he abandoned the concept of libido and developed a completely teleological theory in which the telos was the re-established unity of the self (Fairbairn 1952). Fairbairn did have to return to determinism in that he proposed a primary drive to attach to objects.
Of the other topics in current philosophical discussions to whichSartre offers relevant remarks, I would conclude by mentioningfeminism. This suggestion will certainly raise some eyebrows becauseeven his fans admit that some of the images and language of his earlierwork were clearly sexist in character. And yet, Sartre always favoredthe exploited and oppressed in any relationship and he encouraged hislife-long partner, Simone de Beauvoir, to write The SecondSex, commonly recognized as the seminal work for the second-waveof the feminist movement. In addition to the plausible extrapolationsof many remarks made apropos the exploitation of blacks and Arabs, justmentioned, I shall cite two concepts in Sartre's work that Ibelieve carry particular promise for feminist arguments.
Coming Home to the Homeless How Freud s Unheimliche Became and nmctoastmasters For Freud the uncanny which in its original German Das Unheimliche translates literally as the unhomely belongs to the realm of the
Foucault once dismissed Sartre testily as a man of the nineteenthcentury trying to think the twentieth. Presumably, he had more in mindthan the fact that most of Sartre's “biographies,” except for Jean Genet's and his own, wereof nineteenth-century figures. With his emphasis on consciousness,subjectivity, freedom, responsibility and the self, his commitment toMarxist categories and dialectical thinking, especially in the secondpart of his career, and his quasi Enlightenment humanism, Sartreseemed to personify everything that structuralists andpoststructuralists like Foucault opposed. In effect, the enfantterrible of mid century France had become the “traditionalist”ofthe following generation. A classic example of philosophicalparricide.
Freud’s theory went through many modifications. He had two main models of the mind. In the first model which was the most deterministic, he thought of consciousness as being impelled by the unconscious sexual instinct which he called libido. In this, the topographical model (Freud 1900), he asserted that if libidinal expression was inhibited intrapsychically, it would be discharged as anxiety. By the time of his second, the structural model (Freud 1923), he had added aggression as a second instinct (Freud 1920). In this model, instinctual expression was brought under control by the super-ego, the repository of cultural attitudes. In 1926 he said that anxiety was the response of the ego, under the hegemony of the superego, to the pressure of instinctual demands for expression (Freud 1926). In the single instinct model, libido, via the process Freud called sublimation, was channeled into culturally acceptable forms of expression (Freud 1905). In his final dual instinct theory a more complex view of sublimation was developed in which aggressive and sexual drives amalgamated to form more complex modes of expression (Freud 1923).
est is a hodgepodge of philosophical bits and pieces seemingly culled from the carcasses of existential philosophy, motivational psychology, Maxwell Maltz's Psycho-cybernetics, Zen Buddhism, Alan Watts, Freud, Abraham Maslow, L.
Schopenhauer, challenging Hegel’s rationalism, said that the other side of reality was the will, which was forever seeking expression (Schopenhauer 1969). He said that the will was guided in its expression by forms, similar to those described by Plato, and that the ultimate goal of human life was to escape, via asceticism, from the power of the will. Schopenhauer’s concept of the will influenced Freud in his development of the libido hypothesis.
Freud’s most deterministic thinking occurred in the early part of his career and this aspect of his thinking was challenged by some of his followers. Jung was the most famous schismatic colleague. Others such as Rank (Rank 1929), who developed some of the first ideas on object relations, and Ferenczi (1955), who stressed the importance of the therapeutic elements in the analytic relationship, differed from Freud but stayed in the psychoanalytic fold. The differences were framed in terms of disagreements on the primacy of libido as a motivating for e, but looking back we can see the arguments as being challenges, via teleology, to the hegemony of determinism.
At the end of the eighteenth century Immanuel Kant revised the Enlightenment view on epistemological grounds, saying that knowledge of the world is limited by cognitive capacities (Kant 1965). This led him to divide the world of objects into what we could know, which he called the phenomenal world, and what we could never know, which he called the noumenal world or the thing-in-itself. Kant’s epistemological move opened the way to new formulations of teleology as his immediate philosophical successors took up his idea of a two tiered reality but criticized his formulation as being too abstract and posited a state beyond immediate experience which could be eventually realized.
The essential starting-point is the work of Freud, available in the remarkable English translation of James Strachey, with very good editorial apparatus. Note that the 24 vols (including index) do not include the so-called Pre-Psychoanalytic Work, less easily available in English:
Another of the famous social contract philosophies, Locke's begins with a law of nature, the law being reason: that "no one ought to harm another in his health, liberty, or posessions." The work impassioned the framers of the American Constitution and gave voice to constitutional government.